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Abstract
We address the question in the title using survey-based measures of financial
constraints, as opposed to the proxies typically used in the literature. We find that in our
dataset of Italian firms, those declaring to be financially constrained are smaller and younger
than the others. However, the size distribution of non constrained firms is significantly
skewed, and virtually overlaps with the FSD for the entire sample. Similar conclusions are
drawn from the analysis of a large subsample comprising very young firms. These results are
broadly confirmed using several non survey-based proxies of financial constraints, and over
a second large sample including firms from OECD and non OECD countries. The analysis of
the latter dataset suggests that financial constraints are a relatively more serious problem in
developing countries. We conclude that financial constraints cannot be the main determinant
of the FSD evolution over time, especially in financially developed economies.
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* Bank of Italy, Economic Research Department1. Introduction
1
The conventional wisdom known as Gibrat’s law holds that firm size and growth are
independent and that the firm size distribution (FSD) is stable over time and approximately
lognormal. This view has been challenged by a series of recent papers (see Sutton (1997),
Lotti and Santarelli (2003) for recent surveys of the literature). Among them, Cabral and Mata
(2003) (CM henceforth) reach several important results. The paper begins by documenting
two stylized facts about the FSD: first, the distribution of young firms is very skewed to the
right (most of the mass is on small firms); second, the skewness tends to diminish
monotonically with firm age (the distribution of older firms is more symmetric than that of
young firms). While these facts have been also discussed in previous literature using cross-
sections of firms of different ages, CM focus on longitudinal data, identifying a cohort of
firms at birth and following their evolution over time. Next, the paper argues that financial
constraints (fc) are the main determinant of the observed FSD evolution; a simple theoretical
model shows that the size of startups is given by the minimum between the optimal size and
the entrepreneur’s wealth, which determines whether fc are binding. Thus, constrained
entrepreneurs will be forced to choose a sub-optimal firm size; the optimal size is reached as
soon as fc are released. To test this theory, CM resort to a series of assumptions to identify
constrained firms: that fc are especially relevant for young firms, that fc can be proxied by the
entrepreneur’s wealth, and finally, that the latter can be proxied by age (young entrepreneurs
should be less wealthy, and hence more financially constrained). The empirical evidence,
building on these assumptions, supports the view that the reduction in the FSD skewness over
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time is explained by the gradual relaxation of fc.
2 This view, probably presented in its starkest
version by CM, has found some support in the recent literature.
3
Although financial constraints are widely recognized as an important determinant of
firm size, the thesis that the evolution of the FSD can be explained mostly or exclusively by
fc cannot be deemed well-established yet. First, finance is just one of the factors considered
in the literature on the determinants of firm growth.
4 In addition, the effect of financial
development on average firm size and on the FSD skewness may be a priori ambiguous: the
relaxation of financial constraints should allow existing firms to grow faster, but should also
foster the creation of new firms, with contrasting effects on the FSD skewness.
5
Furthermore, since financially constrained firms are not directly observed, they are usually
identified via assumptions that are typically untested. CM’s proxies for fc are based on
plausible and clever assumptions. However, like those used in most of the literature, they
may well be correlated with fc, but may also pick up other effects that have nothing to do
with them.
6
                                                        
2  While CM admit that their theoretical model is simplified, and that only “to some extent [can fc] explain
the increased skewness in the size distribution that is typically observed in young cohorts of firms” (p. 1079;
italics added), the main message of the paper is clear: “the evolution of the size distribution is determined by
firms ceasing to be financially constrained” (pp. 1075-6).
3 Desai, Gompers and Lerner (2003) find that institutional factors, such as corruption and protection of
property rights, have an impact on the FSD skewness, especially in developing countries. In the light of
previous literature emphasizing the link between these factors and the development of the financial system,
they conclude that in these countries capital constraints lead to skewness in the FSD. Cooley and Quadrini
(2001) present a theoretical model in which financial frictions generate FSD skewness and explain several
stylized facts about firm growth.
4  Other factors include: functioning of the legal system, bureaucratic burden, tax codes, etc.. See Desai,
Gompers and Lerner (2003) for a review of papers dealing with these themes, and Sutton (1997) for a survey of
the theoretical literature.
5  See e.g. Kumar, Rajan and Zingales (1999), Desai, Gompers and Lerner (2003). Rajan and Zingales
(1998) find that about two thirds of growth at the industry level are explained by the growth of the average
establishment, and only one third by the growth in the number of establishments; however, financial
development has a significant effect on the latter, whereas the effect on the average firm size is generally non
significant.
6  Several proxies of fc have been proposed in the literature. For instance, Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) use
firm size, exploiting the idea that small firms can typically access fewer sources of funds. Petersen and Rajan
(1994) assume that firms that are willing to borrow at high interest rates from non-institutional lenders are
constrained. Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian and Rosen (1994) rely on the idea that entrepreneurs receiving an
inheritance should not suffer from fc. For a critical review, see Schiantarelli (1995).9
The present paper provides a quantitative assessment of the relationship between
financial constraints and the evolution of the FSD, with a primary focus on survey-based
measures of fc. Our datasets have a common denominator: in the course of the survey from
which they originate, entrepreneurs were asked specific questions concerning their firm’s
financial needs and problems. This allows us to directly identify financially constrained
(constrained for brevity in what follows) firms, sidestepping the above mentioned
assumptions, and going directly to the core of the issue: can financial constraints explain the
evolution of the FSD?
We proceed as follows. First, we assess the relationship between our survey-based
proxies of fc and firm size. Controlling for age, we compare nonparametric estimates of the
size distributions for constrained firms and for non constrained ones. We also formally test
the following two hypotheses: (h1) the FSD for constrained firms is equal to that for non
constrained ones; (h2) the FSD for non constrained firms is equal to that for the entire sample.
Note that rejection of (h1) is necessary to support the claim that fc influence the evolution of
the FSD, but only rejection of (h2) is in line with the view that they are an important
determinant of this evolution: for instance, fc firms could be characterized by a highly skewed
FSD (h1 could be rejected), yet, if they were a sufficiently small proportion of the total
sample, the overall impact of fc on the FSD could be negligible (h2 would not be rejected).
Inspection of the estimated densities confirms that the FSD of constrained firms is
indeed more skewed than that for the rest of the sample, but reveals that the difference is
generally modest. Formally, hypothesis (h1) is sometimes rejected, depending on the sample
and on the proxy of fc used, while hypothesis (h2) is virtually never rejected. Similar
conclusions are derived over the subsample of very young firms, those aged 6 years or less,
arguably at the core of CM’s empirical findings. The results are broadly confirmed by a
series of robustness checks. In particular, since survey-based measures of fc such as the ones
we propose are themselves subject to criticism, we also use alternative proxies proposed in
the literature. Also, the following exercise is performed: we estimate the effect of fc in a
given year on a firm’s growth in that year, and simulate the effect of protracted fc on the
FSD. Overall, our results are in line with the conclusion that financial constraints have a
negative impact on firm growth – a conclusion coherent with a large body of theoretical and10
empirical literature – but suggest that they can explain only a modest share of the FSD
evolution over time, especially in countries with fully developed financial systems.
Our first dataset is derived from several surveys of Italian manufacturing firms run by
Mediocredito, a credit institution. The second is the World Business Environment Survey
(WBES), comprising firms from a large number of industrialized and developing countries.
The two sources complement each other in many respects. The Mediocredito surveys ask
firms specific questions, e.g. whether they applied for bank credit but were turned down.
These questions allow us to build dummies for very precise notions of financial constraints.
However, by their own nature, such notions may overlook important aspects of the fc
phenomenon. For instance, a firm might not wish additional credit, yet its performance could
be negatively affected by exceedingly onerous financing conditions, or by an inefficient
banking system. The questions in the WBES, looser but broader in nature, help us overcome
these potential problems: entrepreneurs are asked to judge, on a four point scale, how
problematic is finance for the operation and growth of their business. In addition, the WBES
allows us to make sure that the results obtained with the Mediocredito data are not primarily
due to peculiarities of the Italian environment or dataset, and to probe differences between
industrialized and developing countries.
In the following section we give further details about our datasets and present the
definitions of financially constrained firms. The main results are reported in sections 3 and 4.
Section 5 concludes.
2. The data and the definition of financially constrained firm
The analysis builds on two main datasets. The first comprises a series of four surveys
of Italian firms run in 1992, 1995, 1998 and 2001 by Mediocredito, a long-term credit
institution currently part of Capitalia, an Italian banking group. The resulting samples, each
comprising over 4,000 firms, are stratified by firm size (number of employees) and by
geographical area (North-west, North-east, Center and South), and are representative of the
universe of Italian manufacturing firms with more than 10 employees. Surveys include
questions concerning labor force, investment and export strategies, finance. Questions are11
not always present, as the surveys design evolved over time, and some sections are
monographic; balance sheet data are also available.
7 A key section for our purposes is the
one concerning bank-customer relationships and investment financing decisions, which
allows us to identify constrained firms. Specifically, the 1992 survey asked firms whether
they encountered difficulties in financing the last investment project, prompting 5 possible
causes (insufficient cash flow, lack of collateral, etc.; see the appendix for details). Each
could be assigned various degrees of importance. We define a firm to be constrained in 1992
if at least one prompt was given the highest importance. In subsequent surveys firms were
asked a sharper question: whether they had applied for, but failed to obtain more bank credit.
Following Guiso (1998), a firm is deemed constrained if it answered “yes” to this question.
We deem this our baseline definition. The 1998 and 2001 surveys, which contain slightly
more detailed questions, allow us to replicate the baseline definition, and to analyze a
broader one: firms who answered “yes” to the question “do you wish additional finance?”,
regardless of whether they had actually applied for it. In addition, we can gauge the
importance of “discouraged borrowers” (Jappelli (1990)), firms that needed funds but did not
go to the bank because they believed that credit would have been denied anyway.
8
The second main data source used in the paper is the World Business Environment
Survey (WBES), run by the World Bank between 1998 and 2000 on a large number of firms
with at least 5 employees from OECD and non OECD countries. A summary of the evidence
and a detailed presentation of the dataset is in Batra, Kaufman and Stone (2003); Beck,
Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2004 and 2005), Desai, Gompers and Lerner (2003) are
just some of the works that use it. The WBES questions on financing problems are
somewhat similar to those in the Mediocredito dataset, but broader in scope. Specifically,
                                                        
7  Each time a survey was run, a large number of firms was replaced (the motivation is not available), so
that the 1992-1995 and 1998-2001 balanced panels contain about 1,500 and 1,100 firms, in the order. Only
these two balanced panels were created, since a common firm identifier between the 1995 and the 1998 surveys
was unavailable to us. For firms present in the balanced panels we could check whether the age differential was
different from 3, and found some errors. Since age is crucial for the analysis, these observations were dropped
from the sample. For the 1998 and 2001 surveys, where the social security code is available, we also checked
the age field using the Cerved Business Information dataset, that virtually represents the universe of
incorporated business in Italy (see www.cerved.com for information). When the figure from Cerved matched
that available in either Mediocredito survey we assumed that it was correct, and replaced it in the other survey.
8  Definitions of financially constrained firms similar to our baseline are also adopted by Angelini, Di
Salvo and Ferri (1998). Jappelli (1990) and Duca and Rosenthal (1993) derive analogous measures from the
Survey of Consumer Finances, in the context of studies of credit constraints among US consumers.12
entrepreneurs are required to judge how problematic are several factors for the operation and
growth of their business. They are prompted to choose from a list comprising ten different
factors (finance, infrastructure, taxes and regulation, etc.; see the appendix), and to rank
them in order of importance. We define a firm to be constrained if it perceives finance to be
a “major obstacle”.
Finally, to address specific drawbacks of the Mediocredito sample we use two
additional datasets which contain similar survey-based information on fc. The first is the
Survey on Investment in Industry run annually by the Bank of Italy, a large dataset
comprising Italian manufacturing firms of medium-large size (see Guiso (1998) for a
synthetic description). While we deemed this data source inadequate for our main analysis,
due to its insufficient coverage of young and small firms, we use it in section 3.3 to assess
the degree of persistence of the fc phenomenon. The second is a one-off survey run in 1995
by Federcasse, an institution representing Italian small cooperative banks, and used by
Angelini, Di Salvo and Ferri (1998). This dataset, which comprises over 2,000 very small
non financial firms, is used in section 3.3 to assess the possible bias generated by the
exclusion of units with less than 10 employees from the Mediocredito sample.
9
3. Evidence from the Mediocredito dataset
3.1  Stylized facts
Figure 1 confirms that the stylized facts documented by CM hold in the Mediocredito
dataset: the FSD for the entire pooled sample (solid thick line) is clearly skewed to the right;
the skewness tends to diminish with age.
10 The null hypothesis of equality of the FSDs is
strongly rejected for any two contiguous age classes (see the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests
                                                        
9  The Mediocredito dataset can be requested from the provider at www.capitalia.it. See Capitalia (2002)
for details. The WBES is freely available on the World Bank’s webpage. The Survey on Investment in Industry
is currently subjected to restricted access, due to a pledge of confidentiality made by the Bank of Italy during
the data collection phase. The Federcasse dataset can be requested from the provider
(rdisalvo@federcasse.bcc.it).
10  In figure 1, as in all the figures presented below, we checked that pooling data from various surveys did
not hide significant heterogeneity across individual surveys. Section I of CM, devoted to the stylized facts, also
relies on the cross-section dimension of their dataset. The densities appearing in this section are computed
using a kernel density smoother with a bandwith of 0.7.13
reported in the figure). One relevant difference relative to CM’s data from the Quadros do
Pessoal is that the latter comprise a larger share of small firms: the modal size is less than 10
employees, against about 35 in our dataset. This difference to a large extent reflects the
design of the Mediocredito sample, which excludes firms with less than 10 employees. This
exclusion can represent a serious inconvenience for our purposes, hence we specifically
address it in subsection 3.3. With this caveat in mind, we believe that overall figure 1
replicates the patterns found by CM quite well.
Our choice of age classes deserves a comment. The pooled sample has been broken
down in five classes: up to 6 years; 7 to 15 years; 16 to 25; 26 to 50; and above 50. While
this partition is relatively coarse (CM distinguish between firms aged 1 year, 2-4 years, 5-9
years, etc.), pooling the four surveys allows us to gather over 1,000 observations in our
youngest class, the age group over which CM derive their core regression results.
11
3.2  Firm size and financial constraints
Several important facts emerge from Table 1, which reports basic summary statistics
from the Mediocredito datasets. First, the overall relevance of the fc phenomenon according
to our baseline definition is rather minor, affecting at most 6 percent of the firms (column
(c)). However, this percentage grows considerably if one adopts broader definitions, up to 21
percent among young firms that desire more credit (column (i)). Second, fc are negatively
related to firm age, in line with the existing empirical evidence. The relationship is
particularly strong for discouraged borrowers and for firms desiring more credit (columns (g)
and (i)). Third, controlling for age, constrained firms are smaller than their non constrained
counterparts, regardless of the definition of fc adopted.
12
                                                        
11  Note also that CM use the longest tenure as a proxy for the firm’s age, as the latter is not present in their
dataset. Since tenure is a lower bound for age, the 515 firms used in their analysis are in practice likely to
include older firms, not just startups. From our youngest age class we discarded firms that had performed
acquisitions or carve-outs, as in many cases the age information did not seem reliable. None of the results
derived in sections 3.2-3.5 is affected by this choice.
12  These indications are substantially confirmed by a probit regression of a zero-one dummy built from our
baseline definition of fc on a series of firm-specific variables and industry and year dummies (regressions not
reported). The coefficient of age is found to be negative but not always statistically significant, depending on
the specification. In Guiso (1998) the effect of the firm’s age on the probability of being constrained is never
statistically significant.14
Panel 1 of figure 2 reports estimated FSDs for the four pooled datasets. The solid line
is the FSD for the entire sample. The small-dash line is the density for firms that declared to
have suffered from fc in at least one survey. Here we use the baseline definition: firms asked
for bank credit but were turned down. The long-dash line relates to firms declaring persistent
fc problems. These are identified by balancing the 1992-95 and the 1998-2001 panels and
tracking firms that reported fc in two consecutive surveys. In line with the a priori, these two
distributions, especially the one relating to persistently constrained firms, are more skewed
than that of the entire sample. However, the distribution of non constrained firms (dotted
line) virtually coincides with that for the entire sample (indeed, it is not visible in the figure).
This reflects the fact that the number of constrained firms according to this definition is very
low, as we saw from table 1.
To support the graphical analysis, we perform nonparametric tests of the following two
hypotheses: (h1) the FSD for constrained firms is equal to that for the rest of the sample;
(h2) the FSD for non constrained firms is equal to that for the entire sample. As mentioned
above, rejection of (h1) is necessary to support CM’s claim, but only rejection of (h2) is
consistent with the view that fc are an important determinant of the FSD evolution. In panel
1 of figure 2 only (h1) for persistently constrained firms can be rejected.
Panel 2 of figure 2 presents analogous FSDs for young firms (aged 6 years or less).
Two main differences emerge relative to panel (1). First, the curve for persistently
constrained firms is missing, as there is only one such firm out of 189 very young firms in
the joint 1992-95 and 1998-2001 balanced panels. This could to some extent be due to
selection, as firms in the balanced panel have managed to survive for at least 3 years, and
hence may be comparatively less constrained than newborn firms. However, even if
selection explained most of this result, it would imply that fc are no longer a problem shortly
after birth.
13 Second, neither hypothesis (h1) or (h2) can be rejected. Overall, the figure
                                                        
13 For the reasons discussed in Section 2 (limited number of startups, large proportion of firms that drop
out of the sample for unknown reasons), our dataset is not well-suited to analyze the issue of selection. We
attempted to replicate figure 4 in CM by pooling the 1992-95 and 1998-01 balanced panels and following the
evolution of startups (defined as firms with less than 4 years of age at the beginning of the period). We found
that the density of firms surviving after three years is less skewed, though it is virtually identical to the one
calculated for the whole sample of newborn firms at the beginning of the period. As far as it goes, this evidence
supports CM’s claim that selection does not seem the main driver of the evolution of FSD over time.15
delivers the same message as panel (1): the FSD of constrained firms is (slightly) more
skewed to the right than that for non constrained firms; the latter FSD is virtually
indistinguishable from that of the entire sample. A full breakdown by year of the youngest
age class reveals that the share of constrained firms remains modest across the various
groups, and does not display a clear relationship with age.
Figure 3 is the equivalent of figure 2 for our broader definition of constrained firms:
those that wanted additional finance. Recall from table 1 that the quantitative importance of
the fc phenomenon rises substantially according to this measure. Once more, panel 1 looks
reasonable in terms of the effects of fc on size. Hypothesis (h1) is rejected for both
constrained and persistently constrained firms, but the two FSDs are now almost identical;
further, as before, hypothesis (h2) cannot be rejected, as the distribution for firms not
desiring more credit virtually coincides with that for the entire sample. The corresponding
densities for young firms are in panel 2. The two curves for firms desiring and not desiring
more credit are virtually indistinguishable. As before, the set of persistently constrained
firms is virtually empty.
Finally, broadly similar indications emerge from the analysis of our third definition of
fc firms, discouraged borrowers (figure 4): hypotheses (h1) and (h2) cannot be rejected,
either for the entire sample or for very young firms; the number of persistently constrained
firms is negligible.
Summing up, the evidence presented is at odds with the view that financial constraints
can explain the main characteristics of the FSD evolution over time. It is also at odds with a
narrower interpretation of CM’s paper, i.e. that fc can explain the evolution of the size
distribution of young firms.
3.3  Potential pitfalls of the analysis
In this subsection we try to account for three potential problems of the graphical
analysis seen thus far. The first has to do with an intrinsic limit of the Mediocredito sample,
which does not include firms with less than 10 employees. If fc are related to firm size, as we
have just seen, this censoring may generate an underestimate of the number of constrained
firms, and therefore bias the FSDs estimated in the previous subsection. However, several16
pieces of evidence suggest that this bias may not be substantial. Specifically, firms in the
2001 survey are smaller than in the previous three: the median firm has 24 employees, as
opposed to 36 for the pooled sample used in the previous subsection. We replicated figure 2
using this survey, without detecting significant qualitative changes (figure not reported).
14 In
addition, Angelini, Di Salvo and Ferri (1998), working on a cross-section of about 2,000
very small firms (about 10 employees on average), find that the size difference between
constrained and non constrained firms (according to either the broad or narrow definition
used in the present paper) is negligible.
15 We used this dataset to replicate the analysis in
section 3.2. The resulting figure (not reported) replicates the patterns of skewness in the
latter figure 2 quite well (of course, in this case the density for persistently constrained firms
is missing); we could reject hypothesis (h1), but not hypothesis (h2).
Another potential problem of the analysis in section 3.2 has to do with the fact that the
survey questions about fc refer to the year before the survey was run (see the appendix).
Thus, while firms reported themselves as non constrained, say, in 1991 and 1994, based on a
literal interpretation of the questionnaire they could have been constrained in 1989 and 1992
and/or in 1990 and 1993, i.e., in up to 4 years out of 6. By symmetry, firms declaring to be
constrained in 1991 or 1994 could have been non constrained in the other years. This
problem does not affect the analysis of the next section, as the WBES questions concerning
financial constraints are not referred to a specific year. However, it may well bias the
estimated FSD in figures 2 through 4.
Since this is, once more, an intrinsic limit of the Mediocredito surveys, run every 3
years, we gauge the persistence of the fc phenomenon using the Survey on Investment in
Industry run annually by the Bank of Italy, briefly described in section 2. It turns out that the
                                                        
14  Also, for the 2001 survey stratification weights are available. Therefore, weighted versions of the FSDs
in figures 1 and 2 were estimated. The median firm is now even smaller, around 21 employees. However, the
overall patterns of the figure remain unchanged. Moreover, figure 1 was replicated using pooled information
for more than 300,000 firms over the 1993-2002 period, obtained from Cerved Business Information database
(see footnote 6). This database is particularly suited to check the FSD by age class, reported in fig.1. The
median age is 6 years and median sales are around 540,000 euro, against 20 years and around 2 million euro for
the Mediocredito counterpart. In spite of these differences, computing the analogue of fig. 1 over this dataset
yields qualitatively similar results.
15  They also find that the share of firms desiring more credit is 26 percent, i.e. much higher than in the
Mediocredito sample, confirming that the exclusion of firms with less than 10 employees from the latter
probably leads to underestimate the pervasiveness of the fc phenomenon.17
probability of being (not being) constrained in t conditional upon being (not being)
constrained in t-1 is 36.4 (96.9) percent. A firm constrained in t and t-3 has a 70 percent
probability of being constrained in three out of four years (35 percent in all four years). By
contrast, conditional on not being constrained in the first and fourth year, the probability of
not being constrained at all in the entire period is 98 percent. These figures, obtained with
our baseline definition of fc, are similar to those derived using the broader definition, firms
desiring more credit. Thus, there is a reasonably high likelihood that the firms deemed
“constrained”, “persistently constrained” and “non constrained” are indeed such. Note that
this applies particularly to very young firms: when a one year old firm declares to have been
constrained, the statement applies to its entire life; in the case of a two year old firm
declaring fc in her second year of life, based on the transition probabilities given above, we
can expect her to have been constrained for about two thirds of her life, and so forth.
A third potential shortcoming of our approach is that survey-based measures of
financial constraints may misrepresent the complex phenomenon of firms’ financing
conditions.
16 To check for this possibility we split our sample according to the distribution of
two alternative, frequently used proxies for financial constraints. The first is the interest
payments coverage suggested by Whited (1992), measured as financial expenses over
financial expenses and profits. This proxy should be directly related to financial constraints,
since if a firm can generate sufficient internal funds it will not be likely to run up against its
debt limit. The second proxy is the ratio between the firm’s fixed and total assets, a measure
of assets tangibility. According to theory and empirical evidence (e.g. Rajan and Zingales
(2001), Giannetti (2003)) the availability of collateral, in the form of “hard assets”, increases
the entrepreneur’s effort, thereby making external finance more easily available. We define a
firm to be constrained if it lies in the bottom quartile of the distribution of either indicator,
and use the related dummy variables to replicate the graphical analysis. Figure 5, obtained
with the first measure, broadly confirms the results seen thus far: constrained firms are
smaller than the rest of the sample, but the difference in the relative FSDs is small and not
statistically significant, for the entire sample as well as for the subsample of very young
                                                        
16  Batra et al. refer to the kvetch (Yiddish for “continually complain”) factor: firms that perform poorly
may tend to shift the blame on difficulties presented by the economic environment, e.g. by the financial system,
and likewise, those that perform well may tend to underplay the role of these external factors.18
firms. Figure 6 uses the collateral-based proxy. In panel (1) both hypotheses (h1) and (h2)
are rejected. However, the difference between the FSDs for non constrained firms and for the
entire sample is very small. In addition, neither hypothesis (h1) or (h2) can be rejected for
younger firms (panel (2)).
Finally, following Rajan and Zingales (1998), we split the sample between firms
belonging to sectors that are highly dependent on external finance and the others, and
compare the related FSDs. No significant differences between the two groups emerge
(results not reported). This may suggest that this partition is suited to detect cross-country
differences regarding the development of the financial system, rather than to proxy for the
intensity of fc in a given country.
3.4  Regression analysis
In sub-section 3.2 we looked at the FSD of firms that declared to suffer from fc in a
given year, as opposed to the FSD of firms that did not. We argued that doing so is
reasonable if financial constraints are sufficiently persistent, and provided some evidence
that they are. However, since one might not be convinced by this persistence argument, in
what follows we try to assess the effect of fc in a given year on firms’ growth in that year.
We then use this estimated effect to simulate the consequence of persistent financial
constraints on the FSD. While the evidence in the previous two sections has no implications
for (nor is it affected by) causality issues, following CM we now assume that causality goes
from fc to size, and estimate the following regression (overlooking firm-specific subscripts):
ln(n° employeest) - ln(n° employeest-1) = α 0Dummy for fct + α 1ln(total assetst-1)




j jyeardummy β α sectordummyj + ε t
Since the survey questions about financial constraints refer to 1991, 1994, 1997 and
2000, we use the percentage change in employment in those years as the dependent
variable.
17 We control for the size of the firm, proxied by the logarithm of total assets and for
its profitability, proxied by ROA (defined as earnings before interest and taxes over total
                                                        
17  This can be computed because in each survey firms report their end-of-year number of employees in
each of the previous three years.19
assets). The regression allows us to control for several potentially important determinants of
the FSD (e.g. industry effects) overlooked in the graphical analysis.
The estimates are reported in table 2. The various proxies of fc discussed above are
included, one at the time, among the explanatory variables. The first two columns, showing
results obtained with the baseline definition of fc, suggest the following conclusions. First,
the effect of fc in a given year on growth in that year is negative and statistically significant.
Based on specification (a), constrained firms grow by 0.9 percentage points less than the rest
of the sample. Second, this effect is entirely due to firms with less than 50 employees
(specification (b)). This finding is consistent with a large body of literature supporting the
existence of a relationship between size and fc (see e.g. Carpenter and Petersen (2002)).
Third, the coefficient of the dummy for young constrained firms is not significant. Fourth,
more profitable firms tend to grow faster. Moreover, confirming existing results (see e.g.
Evans (1987), Hall (1987)), older firms tend to grow more slowly.
Specifications  (c)  through  (f)) replicate the estimates using the dummies for
discouraged borrowers and for firms desiring more credit. While constrained firms according
to the former definition do not grow significantly less than the rest of the sample, the latter
do. Allowing the effect to differ across firms of different size (column (f)) reveals again that
the effect is concentrated among small firms.
18 Results for our non survey-based proxies, in
columns (g) through (j), do not significantly affect the overall picture. Constrained firms
grow significantly less than the rest of the sample. In the case of firms with low collateral,
the estimated effect of fc is slightly smaller than that obtained with our baseline definition of
constrained firms, in columns (a)-(b).
To relate these results to the graphical analysis of the previous subsection, we
performed the following exercises. First, we reduced the size of each firm in the entire
pooled sample by 7 percent, roughly corresponding to the estimated effect of fc for 7
consecutive years, based on the 0.9 coefficient in specification (a). We then computed the
                                                        
18 These regressions were run over the last two surveys, whereas those in columns (a)-(b) and (g)-(j) use
all four surveys. To make sure that results are not reflecting this sample difference, the latter regressions were
re-run over the 1998-2001 surveys only. Also, all the regressions in table 2 were re-run without ROA, which
could also proxy for fc, and therefore be collinear with our dummies for constrained firms. In none of these
cases did significant differences emerge (results not reported).20
FSD for these firms, and plotted it against the FSD for the pooled sample. Next, the exercise
was replicated by reducing the size of firms with less that 50 employees by 12 percent, based
on the coefficient in specification (b). The resulting curves are in figure 7. The difference
between the FSDs for fc and non fc firms is very small. Note that the order of magnitude of
our estimated effects in table 2 is broadly in line with previous studies. In particular, Rajan
and Zingales (1998) find that firms with heavy dependence on external finance grow
significantly less than firms with low dependence if they are located in financially
underdeveloped countries. The estimated effect on the firm’s annual growth rate ranges
between 0.4 and 1.3 percent, depending on the proxy of financial development used. Beck,
Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2005), using the WBES sample, find that the effect of
financial constraints on firm’s annual growth is at most 4.3 percent and tends to become
statistically zero in financially developed countries. Summing up, these results confirm the
negative relationship between fc and firm size, but suggest that the overall impact on the
FSD is quantitatively modest.
3.5  Additional issues
In what follows we report the findings from a series of additional checks which do not
qualitatively alter the main results emerging from the previous subsections, but may be
relevant for qualifying and assessing them.
First, we looked at alternative definitions of size. Figures 1 through 6 were replicated
replacing the number of employees with total sales (results not reported). The only visible
change concerns the density for the entire pooled sample, which becomes more symmetric
than its counterpart in figure 1, although some right skewness remains clearly visible. None
of the other patterns record significant qualitative changes.
Next, we checked whether accounting for group membership can affect our results.
Participation in a group may allow the firm to access inter-company funds through the
holding company, typically a large, well-established firm with easy access to capital
markets. In fact, group membership has been used as a proxy for no financial constraints
(Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991); Guiso, Kashyap, Panetta and Terlizzese (1999)).
Industrial groups represent an important phenomenon in Italy. A relatively large share of
firms in our dataset (over 20 percent on average) declares to belong to a group. Indeed, the21
average number of employees of these firms is much larger if compared to the rest of the
sample (365 vs. 62 over the pooled dataset). First, we look at the relationship between our
dummies for fc and group membership dummies. In all four surveys the share of constrained
firms (according to the baseline definition) is slightly but systematically smaller among
firms belonging to a group (4.2 vs. 4.9 percent over the pooled sample), confirming that
group membership does proxy for fc. However, the analysis of the motivations for group
membership, made possible by a specific section of the 1995 survey, suggests that firms
perceive the advantages of membership as mainly related to efficiency considerations, and
not to financial problems.
19 Second, we replicated figure 1 over the subsample of firms
belonging to a group. No significant alteration in the patterns of the figure are detected; all
the age densities are shifted to the right, but the dispersion among them remains basically
unaffected. Next, we looked at the size of group members vs. non members. In the age class
of up to 6 years the average number of employees is 162 for the former, against 44 for the
latter, entailing a ratio of 3.7 to 1. If group membership released fc, and if fc were especially
relevant among young firms, this ratio should be highest for this age class. By contrast, it
increases for older age classes, reaching 6 among firms aged 50 years or more. Overall, this
evidence suggests that group membership is strongly related to firm size, but that this
relationship is not the main determinant of the stylized facts documented above.
4. Evidence from the WBES sample
Could our results reflect peculiarities of Italian firms, or of our specific sample? The
Italian industrial system has several well-known peculiarities – the most evident one being
the exceptional share of very small firms – which may reflect country-specific institutional
                                                        
19  In the 1995 survey firms were asked to choose from the following motivations for group membership: a)
labor cost reduction; b) business diversification; c) scope economies; d) advantages in the acquisition of
production inputs; e) better control of the distribution process; f) fiscal benefits; g) increased access to risk
capital; h) reduction in business risk; i) family members involvement; j) other advantages. Motivations a), b)
and e) were the most frequently chosen and highly ranked. Relatively few firms chose answers g) and j), that
could entail financial considerations.22
factors and historical developments. Therefore, in what follows we analyze the World
Business Environment Survey (WBES), briefly described in section 2.
20
After eliminating missing values for the relevant variables (i.e. age and annual sales
that is a proxy for size), we are left with 3,133 firms, mostly from non OECD countries. As a
preliminary step, we estimate FSDs for the age classes in figure 1, and find similar patterns
(results not reported). Next, we split the sample according to the values of the synthetic
indicator of financial problems described in section 2 and in the appendix. This indicator has
two important advantages with respect to the ones derived from the Mediocredito surveys.
First, the question concerning fc is worded in very broad terms, not just in terms of bank
finance. Second, it does not specifically refer to a given year; thus, it can be argued that
firms declaring to face major financial problems are indeed persistently constrained. As we
argued above, this holds, in particular, for young firms. The resulting FSDs are in figures 8
and 9, for OECD and non OECD countries, in the order. One difference relative to the
previous graphs is that size is measured by the dollar value of annual sales.
21 Aside from
this, the main message emerging from figure 8 is broadly in line with that of the previous
section. First, financial constraints are negatively related to firm size, but the amount of
skewness that they can explain seems modest, as the FSD for non constrained firms is very
similar to the one for the entire sample. Second, neither hypothesis (h1) or (h2) can be
rejected (in either panel none of the densities is statistically different from the others),
although in the case of young firms this may depend on the limited number of observations
available. Finally, in both panels the difference between the FSDs of constrained vs. non
constrained firms appears to be larger than in the figures of the previous section. This could
                                                        
20 The synthetic indicator of financial obstacles to growth reported by Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and
Maksimovic (2005) using the WBES has an average value of 1.98 for Italian firms. This corresponds to a
perception of finance as a minor obstacle and squares well with the evidence in the previous section. The index
for Portugal averages 1.82, suggesting that the two financial systems should be broadly comparable.
21  The densities discussed in this section (computed using a kernel density smoother with a bandwith of
1.5) appear more symmetric than those in the previous figures. The evidence in section 3.5 suggests that this is
probably due to the use of sales as a measure of size. The WBES questionnaire features specific questions
concerning the number of employees. However, the WBES spreadsheet contains only a dummy for small,
medium and large firms. Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2005) mention that these classes correspond
to 5-50 employees, 51-500 and beyond 500 employees. Using this size breakdown - instead of sales - does not
alter the main messages emerging from the analysis. We also experimented with alternative definition of fc,
built using the detailed information in the finance section of the questionnaire. Broadly, we found the
relationship between firm size and these alternative definitions to be weaker.23
be due to the above mentioned fact that the WBES survey questions do not refer to a given
year, and may therefore identify persistently constrained firms.
Figure 9, relating to non–OECD countries, confirms that financial constraints are
negatively related to firm size. However, in panel (1) both hypotheses (h1) and (h2) can be
rejected, in contrast with the results for OECD countries;
22 furthermore, as regards young
firms in panel (2), hypothesis (h1) is rejected. This evidence is consistent with the view that
fc are a relatively more serious problem in developing countries, a view supported by a body
of empirical literature too large to discuss here (see e.g. Rajan and Zingales (1998);
Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998); Desai, Gompers and Lerner (2003); Beck,
Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2005)).
5. Conclusions
The evidence presented in this paper confirms the stylized facts about firm size
distribution (FSD) discussed by Cabral and Mata (2003): the size distribution of firms is
highly skewed to the right at birth (most of the mass is on small firms); the skewness tends
to diminish with firm age. At the same time, we challenge the explanation of the stylized
facts advanced by CM, which assigns a central role to financial constraints (fc). Our analysis
has relied on survey-based measures of financial constraints available in two large datasets.
The main results can be summarized as follows.
First, the negative link between fc and firm size is confirmed. Firms who declare to be
constrained are on average smaller than those who do not; their FSD is relatively more
skewed to the right. This excess skewness tends to become more pronounced for firms that,
according to our proxies, can be deemed persistently constrained. Although the differences
in the estimated FSD of constrained and non constrained firms are not always statistically
significant, overall this evidence appears consistent with CM’s conclusions.
Second, when narrow definitions of fc are adopted, fc seem to be a real problem for a
small minority of firms, always well below 10 percent in our sample; when alternative,
                                                        
22  While this result can reflect the higher power of the tests for the much more numerous sample of non–
OECD countries, we replicated the tests in figure 9.1 after dropping randomly selected observations from this
sample, and were able to reject the null of equality of distributions (a) and (b) with as little as 250 observations.24
broader measures are used the percentages increase around 20 percent. Regardless of the
definition adopted, however, the FSDs estimated for non constrained firms are virtually
indistinguishable from those for the entire sample. The visual impression is almost
invariably confirmed by formal nonparametric tests of equality of distributions. Thus, fc can
only explain a small fraction of the FSD skewness observed in the entire dataset.
Third, these two conclusions hold not only for the entire sample, but also for very
young firms, those not older than 6 years. This class is particularly important in this context,
because it lies at the core of CM’s empirical results, and also because over this segment of
firms fc problems are a priori likely to be more important, and our measures of presence and
persistence of fc are arguably more precise. The share of young firms suffering from fc
problems is higher than in the rest of the sample, but this is not sufficient to alter the
conclusions reached for the other age classes.
These results, obtained on a sample of Italian firms, are broadly confirmed and
qualified from the analysis of the WBES international dataset, which suggests that the
relationship between firm size and fc tends to be stronger in developing countries. When
attention is restricted to non–OECD countries, arguably those in which the financial system
is relatively underdeveloped, the difference between the estimated FSDs of constrained vs.
non constrained firms becomes statistically significant, even among very young firms. The
robustness of the main results is also confirmed using traditional proxies of fc proposed in
the literature, instead of the survey-based measures used for most of the paper, and by means
of a counterfactual exercise. Specifically, using the sample of Italian firms we quantify the
effect of fc in a given year on the firm’s growth in that year, controlling for a number of
factors such as age, industry, profitability, etc. We then use the estimates to simulate the
effect of protracted financial constraints on the FSD, and show that this effect can only
explain a modest fraction of the FSD evolution over time.
We conclude that financial constraints cannot be the main determinants of the FSD
evolution, especially in financially developed economies. We believe that this conclusion is
in line with a large part of the available theoretical and empirical literature on the subject,
which points out that finance is just one of many factors influencing firm entry, exit and
growth, and that the effects of financial constraints on firm growth tend to be inversely
related to the development of the financial system.Tables and Figures
Fig. 1: Firm size distribution and firm’s age in the Mediocredito dataset 
(*)
(pooled 1992, 1995 1998 and 2001 surveys)
(*) The curves are obtained by pooling the 1992, 1995, 1998 and 2001 surveys. In each survey, the number


























































































































































(*) The definition of financially constrained firms and the notion of “discouraged borrowers” and of firms “desiring
more credit” is in Section 2 and in the appendix. In each survey, the answers to the questions about financial
constraints refer to the previous year.27
Fig. 2: FSD and financial constraints: Baseline definition of fc
(Mediocredito dataset; pooled 1992, 1995, 1998 and 2001 surveys)
(1) Entire sample 
(*)
(2) Young firms (age up to 6 years)
(*) We test for equality of FSD (c) vs. that of the balanced sample (not shown) because the former is computed using the balanced panel.28
Fig. 3: FSD and financial constraints: Firms desiring more credit
(Mediocredito dataset; pooled 1998 and 2001 surveys)
(1) Entire sample 
(*)
(2) Young firms (age up to 6 years)
(*) We test for equality of FSD (c) vs. that of the balanced sample (not shown) because the former is computed using the balanced sample.29
Fig. 4: FSD and financial constraints: Discouraged borrowers
(Mediocredito dataset; pooled 1998 and 2001 surveys)
(1) Entire sample
 (2) Young firms (age up to 6 years)30
Fig. 5: FSD and financial constraints: Firms with low interest coverage 
(*)
(Mediocredito dataset; pooled 1992, 1995, 1998 and 2001 surveys)
(1) Entire sample
(2) Young firms (age up to 6 years)
(*) The number of observations is lower than in figure 2 since for some firms balance sheet data are unavailable.31
Fig. 6: FSD and financial constraints: Firms with low collateral 
(*)
(Mediocredito dataset; pooled 1992, 1995, 1998 and 2001 surveys)
(1) Entire sample 
(2) Young firms (age up to 6 years)
(*) The number of observations is lower than in figure 2 since for some firms balance sheet data are unavailable.Table 2: Dependent variable: Percentage change in n° employees between t and t – 1 
(*)
(Mediocredito dataset; t represents years; OLS regressions)











Between t and t-1 firm is:
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j)
 - financially constrained -0.9** -0.05 -0.2 0.1 -0.7** 0.2 -0.4* 0.1 -0.9** -0.8**
(0.3) (0.5) (0.5) (0.7) (0.2) (0.3) (0.2) (0.3) (0.2) (0.3)
- young and financially constrained 0.1 0.5 -2.3 -2.3 -1.2 -1.2 -0.3 -0.1 -0.5 -0.5
(1.5) (1.5) (2.7) (2.7) (1.1) (1.1) (0.6) (0.6) (0.7) (0.7)
 - small and financially constrained - -1.6** - -0.4 - -1.0* - -0.9** - -0.2
- (0.6) - (0.9) - (0.4) - (0.3) - (0.3)
Ln(total assets at t-1) 0.03 0.01 0.19** 0.19** 0.18* 0.15* 0.03 -0.02 0.03 0.03
(0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.1) (0.1) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
Ln(age at t) -1.3** -1.3** -1.3** -1.3** -1.3** -1.3** -1.3** -1.3** -1.3** -1.3**
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
ROA at t-1 0.11** 0.11** 0.11** 0.11** 0.10** 0.10** 0.11** 0.11** 0.10** 0.10**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
N° observations 12,541 12,541 7,458 7,458 7,458 7,458 12,539 12,539 12,523 12,523
R
2  0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
(*) The various definitions of financially constrained firms are discussed in Section 2 and in the appendix. Small firms are those with less
than 50 employees. Young firms are those not older than 6 years. OLS estimates. Regressions in columns (a)-(b) and (g)-(j) are estimated
over the entire 1992-01 pooled sample, those in columns (c)-(f) over the 1998-01 pooled sample. Extreme outliers were dropped. Each
equation includes time and industry dummies and a constant, whose coefficients are not reported. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors
are reported in parenthesis below coefficients. One or two asterisks indicates significance at the 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.Fig. 7: Results of two counterfactual exercises on the Mediocredito dataset 
(*)
(*) The FSD labeled counterfactual n° 1 was computed over the entire 1992-2001 sample after reducing each
firm’s size by 7 percent. This simulates the effect of a 0.9 percent lower annual growth due to financial
constraints (from table 2, specification (a)) protracted for 7 years. Counterfactual n° 2 was computed over
the entire 1992-2001 sample, after reducing the size of each firm below 50 employees by 12 percentage
points. This simulates the effect of a 1.6 percent lower annual growth for small constrained firms (table 2,
specification (b)) protracted for 7 years.34
Fig. 8: FSD and financial constraints in the WBES dataset: OECD countries 
(*)
(1)  Entire sample
(2) Young firms (age up to 6 years)
(*) Firm size is measured by the log of the annual dollar value of sales. Firms with missing values for age or sales, or
with zero value for sales were dropped.35
Fig. 9: FSD and financial constraints in the WBES dataset: Non OECD countries 
(*)
(1)  Entire sample
(2) Young firms (age up to 6 years)
(*) Firm size is measured by the log of the annual dollar value of sales. Firms with missing values for age or
sales were dropped. A sizeable number of firms reporting annual sales of less than 1,000 dollars were also
dropped.Appendix: definitions of financially constrained firms
Mediocredito surveys
1992 1995 1998 and 2001
Questions
1. “The firm encountered difficulties
in financing the last investment
project? (multiple answers are
allowed, with an intensity ranking
from 1 to 3):
a. Insufficient cash flow or risk
capital
b. Insufficient collateral
c. Insufficient long-term finance




Answered with a “3” to at least one
of the prompts a. through d.
Questions
1. “In 1994 the firm wanted more
credit, asked for it and was turned
down by the bank.”
2. “To obtain more credit the firm
would have accepted either to pay




Answered “yes” to question 1.
Discouraged borrowers 
(*)
Answered “no” to question 1 and
“yes” to question 2.
Questions
1.  “In the previous year the firm
wanted more loans at the prevailing
market conditions.”
2.  “The firm asked for more credit
but was turned down by the bank.”
3.  “To obtain more credit the firm
would have accepted to pay a
slightly higher loan rate.”
Financially constrained firms
 (baseline definition)




Answered “yes” to questions 1 and 3
and “no” to question 2.
Firms desiring more credit
Answered “yes” to question 1
World Business Environment Survey (WBES)
 (**)
Questions
“Please judge on a four point scale how problematic are the following factors for the operation and growth of
your business. (Please do not select more than 3 obstacles as “major” (4)) and please circle the single most
important obstacle):”
a. Financing:       No obstacle (1); Minor obstacle (2); Moderate obstacle (3); Major obstacle (4).
b. Infrastructure:  ……….
………
Financially constrained firms
Answered with a “4” to item “financing”
 (*) Discouraged borrowers from the 1995 Mediocredito survey were not used in the analysis, because the
wording of the questions is slightly different relative to the 1998 and 2001 surveys. However, pooling
discouraged borrowers from all three surveys does not qualitatively alter the results. 
(**) The complete list of factors affecting firm operation and growth prompted by the WBES is the
following: a. Financing; b. Infrastructure (e.g. telephone, electricity, water, roads, land); c. Taxes and
Regulations; d. Policy instability/uncertainty; e. Inflation; f. Exchange Rate; g. Functioning of the judiciary; h.
Corruption; i. Street crime/theft/disorder; j. Organized Crime/Mafia; k. Anti-competitive practices by
government or private enterprises; l. Other.References
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